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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
At trial, the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the criminal charge of felony
driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the Court declared a mistrial. Trial defense counsel
raised questions regarding the evidence offered to prove that Mr. Warden was driving while
intoxicated on a publicly‐maintained highway or road. The parties negotiated an oral plea
agreement, wherein Appellant agreed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of excessive
misdemeanor DUI under Idaho Code §18‐8004C, in exchange for certain sentencing
recommendations and the ability to reserve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction for appeal.
Mr. Warden is a strong supporter of tribal rights and opposes the assertion of State
jurisdiction over tribal members, tribal land and private land located within the confines of the
Nez Perce Reservation. On appeal, Mr. Warden asserts that the district court erred when it did
not dismiss the charge because the State of Idaho lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged.
This case presents the issue of whether the assertion of subject matter jurisdiction under Idaho
Code §67‐5101(G) encompasses that portion of a state highway right‐of‐way located on Tribal
land, which portion is not being maintained, used or intended to be used for the purposes of
highway vehicular travel. The purpose and use of that right‐of‐way portion in question was to
crush and store gravel used by state highway maintenance vehicles.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Robert Warden is an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Tribe. (Tr. 1, p. 10, Ls. 14‐19.)1
On May 1, 2013, he confronted members of a local pistol shooting group at a gravel pit located
adjacent to State Highway 13 in Idaho County, Idaho. (Tr. 2, p. 34, L. 9 – p. 43, L. 21.) Mr. Warden
accused the shooting club members of being on Tribal property without permission. (Tr. 2, p. 43,
Ls. 10‐12.) The group members responded that they had permission from the property owner to
use the gravel pit. (Tr. 2, p. 43, Ls. 12‐14; Tr. 2, p. 63, Ls. 8‐19.)
The gravel pit is located within the confines of the Nez Perce Reservation. (Tr. 2, p. 63,
Ls. 2‐5.) The paved roadway (State Highway 13) is maintained by the State of Idaho Highway
Department. (Tr. 2, p. 8, Ls. 11‐24.) The State of Idaho has a 200‐foot right‐of‐way over a portion
of the gravel pit, measured from the center line of State Highway 13. (Tr. 2, p. 16, L. 15 – p. 17,
L. 25.) The gravel pit is not part of the paved highway or shoulder. (Tr. 2, p. 21, L. 22 – p. 22, L.
18.) State Highway 13 is 24‐feet wide at the point at it passes alongside the gravel pit. (Tr. 2, p.
23, Ls. 14‐17.)
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Warden had committed the crime
of Driving Under the Influence, a felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§18‐8004(1)(a) and 18‐
8005(9), (R., pp. 13‐14.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound Mr. Warden over to
the district court. (R., pp. 21‐23.) The State filed a Criminal Information charging Mr. Warden

Appellant refers to the court reporter transcripts certified on September 25, 2015 as “Tr. 1,” and the
transcripts certified on or about March 12, 2016 as “Tr. 2.”
1
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with felony operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp. 25‐26.) Mr.
Warden entered a not guilty plea. (R., p. 27.) The State moved to amend the Information in
response to Appellant raising in a pro se motion jurisdictional issues regarding the gravel pit. The
Court granted the motion to amend. (R., pp. 39‐40, 51‐52.)
Mr. Warden filed a number of pretrial motions without the assistance of counsel. The
motions included a Motion to Dismiss on December 9, 2013 (R., pp. 35‐38); a Motion to Dismiss
Information on December 26, 2014 (R., pp. 85‐86; a Motion to Suppress Evidence on January 20,
2015 (R., pp. 91‐92); a Motion to Dismiss on January 20, 2015 (R., p. 93); a Motion to Suppress
Statements (R., p. 102); a Motion to Dismiss Information on March 16, 2015 (R., pp. 106‐108); a
Motion for Fair Hearing and Extradition Before Nez Perce Tribal Court on March 16, 2015 (R., pp.
109‐110); and a Motion to Change Jurisdictional Venue on March 18, 2015 (R., p. 111). The
motions all related to a challenge to state jurisdiction over Appellant and over the offense
charged.
On April 4, 2014, the trial court held: “With respect to the motions, as I indicated, the
Court does have personal and subject matter jurisdiction. That motion will be denied.” (Tr. 1, p.
4, L. 11 – p. 12, L. 7; p. 18, Ls. 6‐9; p. 26, L. 10‐ ‐ p. 27, L. 5.)
On the eve of trial, when the issue of jurisdiction was raised anew, the trial court
confirmed that the State had to meet its burden of proof regarding State Highway 13 and the
extent of the right‐of‐way in the gravel pit at trial. (Tr. 1, p. 34, L. 21 – p. 38, L. 5.)
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The case proceeded to trial on April 22‐23, 2015. (R., pp. 139‐156.) The jury failed to
reach a unanimous verdict. (R., p. 155.)
The parties negotiated a plea agreement on April 24, 2015, wherein Appellant agreed to
plead guilty to a reduced charge of misdemeanor excessive DUI under Idaho Code §18‐8004C, in
exchange for certain sentencing recommendations and the ability to preserve the jurisdictional
proof issue for appeal. (Tr. 1, p. 54, L. 25 – p. 20, L. 57.) The parties enunciated the plea
agreement orally on the record, and waived the right to delayed sentencing. (Tr. 1, p. 57, Ls. 3‐
9; Tr. 1, p. 66, Ls. 6‐18.) The district court sentenced Mr. Warden to one year in jail with credit
for time served, suspended the sentence, placed the defendant on probation for one year and
imposed a one‐year driver’s license suspension. (Tr. 1, p. 74, Ls. 1‐14; R., p. 164‐166.)
Mr. Warden filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp. 167‐170.) Substitute counsel filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.
175‐178.)
The issue reserved on appeal was enunciated orally as follows: “whether or not the rock
pit area, not the traveled portion of State Highway 13, is outside of the State right‐of‐way and is
within Indian Country and is a portion not maintained by the State as a highway.” (Tr. 1, p. 56,
Ls. 4‐22.)
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ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the State prove that the DUI (driving under the influence) occurred upon a highway
or road maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Lacked Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Over the Offense Charged.
A.

Introduction
Mr. Warden asserts that the district court erred when it found that subject matter

jurisdiction existed pursuant to Idaho Code §67‐5101(G). Therefore, Mr. Warden’s judgment of
conviction should be vacated and the case against him should be dismissed.
Appellant advocates for a construction of Idaho Code §67‐5101(G), consistent with the
narrow canons of construction enunciated by Idaho’s courts in tribal sovereignty cases. See State
v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 793 P.2d 682 (1990); State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 957 P.2d
1095 (1998); State v. Ambro, 142 Idaho 77, 123 P.3d 710 (Ct.App. 2005). If the crime alleged did
not occur on a highway or road maintained by the State of Idaho or a political subdivision thereof,
there is no jurisdiction over the offense and the State cannot exercise its law enforcement
powers. Barros, 131 Idaho at 381, 957 P.2d at 1097.
Mr. Warden’s multiple motions to dismiss, admittedly filed pro se and without the usual
accoutrements of attorney‐drafted filings, encompass “the threshold issue of jurisdiction.”
Barros, 131 Idaho at 381, 957 P.2d at 1097. “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law for which the
record is adequate to allow meaningful review. … See, e.g., State v. Valdez‐Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 897 P.2d 993 (1995) (challenge based on purely legal ground can be decided even though
factual basis sketchy); State v. Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 666 P.2d 1139 (1983) (deciding purely
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legal issue and remanding to district court for additional fact finding).” State v. Barros, 131 Idaho
at 381, 957 P.2d at 1097.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any time,

Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995), over which appellate courts exercise
free review. State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998).” State v. Jones, 101
P.3d 699, 701, 140 Idaho 755 (2004).
Idaho’s appellate courts exercise free review over the application and construction of
statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003).

C.

The District Court Did Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
“Indian Country” is defined by Congress as that land within the limits of an Indian

reservation. 18 U.S.C. §1151. Public Law 280, passed by Congress on August 15, 1953,
automatically transferred to five states, and offered all other states, certain limited jurisdiction
over Indians within Indian Country. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §7, 67 Stat. 590. This Act, as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§1321‐1326 (1970), is commonly referred to as “Public Law 280.” See
State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho at 1011, 793 P.2d at 684. Pursuant to Public Law 280, the Idaho
Legislature enacted Idaho Code §67‐5101 in 1963:
Indian country.‐‐The state of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at
Large, page 589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and
criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following matters and
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purposes arising in Indian county located within this state, as Indian county is defined by
title 18, United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds this state to the assumption
thereof: …
G. Operations and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads
maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof.
This statute must be construed liberally in the Tribe’s favor, and narrowly when the state
is seeking to expand state jurisdiction:
When addressing issues of state jurisdiction in Indian Country, we are guided by the canon
of construction that state and federal legislation passed for the benefit of Indians is to be
construed in the Indians' favor. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 725 P.2d 115 (1986);
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1982). Likewise, statutes and legislation
involving Indian rights are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with any
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit in order to respect and preserve the
vestigial Indian sovereignty. State v. Major, 111 Idaho at 416, 725 P.2d at 121. The law is
well established that the standard of construction requires this Court to narrowly
construe any statutes extending state jurisdiction over Indian Country. Id. Sheppard v.
Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 15, 655 P.2d 895.
State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho at 1011‐1012, 793 P.2d at 684‐685. “[W]e must narrowly
construe Section 67‐5101(G) so as to minimize erosion of tribal sovereignty.” State v. Ambro,
142 Idaho 77, 83, 123 P.3d 710 (Ct.App.2005).
1.

“Highways and Roads” in I.C. §67‐5101(G) Should Not Include the Gravel Pit.

This appeal requires examination of the meaning and construction of the terms “highways
and roads” and “maintained,” as used in Idaho Code §67‐5101(G). In State v. Barros, this Court
addressed the issue of whether a member of the Nez Perce Tribe could be arrested in his home,
after being observed driving erratically and allegedly while under the influence on a highway or
road maintained by the State of Idaho. The Court held in the affirmative, as follows:
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However, we read the purpose of the "upon" language as a designation of where the
crime, in the words of § 67‐5101, must "aris[e] in Indian country" to confer enforcement
power on state officials. In other words, once a crime has been committed on a highway
or road maintained by the state or a political subdivision thereof, state law enforcement
officers gain jurisdiction and have the same power they would have if the crime had been
committed outside of Indian country, including the power to arrest beyond the road right‐
of‐way.2 If, on the other hand, the crime did not occur upon a publicly maintained road,
state law enforcement officers would have no jurisdiction under I.C. §67‐5101(G) and so
no power of arrest either on or off the right‐of‐way.
131 Idaho at 382, 957 P.2d at 1098. The Barros Court construed the word “upon” to be the same
as the word “on.” Barros did not challenge the authority of the State to assume jurisdiction over
the entire right‐of‐way. This appeal challenges that assertion of jurisdiction.
The State argued to the trial court that “operations and management of motor vehicles
upon highways and roads” includes rights‐of‐way, not only the traveled portion and shoulders of
the highway. (Tr. 1, p. 35, L. 20 – p. 37, L. 21.) Outside of the tribal sovereignty arena, Idaho’s
courts have used the definitions found in Title 49 statutes to construe Idaho’s DUI statutes. See,
e.g., State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 974 P.2d 1105 (1999). In Title 49, “highway" means "the entire
width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part is open to the
use of the public for vehicular travel, with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property line,
including sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights‐of‐way not intended for motorized traffic." I.C.
§49‐109(5) (enacted in 1988). "Public right‐of‐way" means “a right‐of‐way open to the public

The term “right‐of‐way” appears to be used to denote two different things in various Idaho opinions: (1)
a route for traveling from one place to another, and (2) an easement over another person’s land.

2
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and under the jurisdiction of a public highway agency, where the public highway agency has no
obligation to construct or maintain said right‐of‐way for vehicular traffic.” I.C. §49‐117(21).
The State asks the Court to construe “highway” to encompass a broad statutory definition
that includes the entire easement reserved to the State. Appellant asks that the Court construe
“highways and roads” narrowly, to exclude rights‐of‐way which, by their very definition, are areas
“where the public highway agency has no obligation to construct or maintain said right‐of‐way
for vehicular traffic.” Appellant asks the Court to make a fact‐specific determination that the
definition should not include the gravel pit area.
Compare the foregoing analysis to that contained in State v. McCormack opinion, whose
rationale hinged on the finding that the statute did not substantially alter the jurisdiction
originally assumed:
Prior to the enactment of I.C. §67‐5101 the Idaho legislature had enacted I.C. §49‐352
which provided for a ninety‐day license suspension for failure to submit to a breath test.
In 1984, the legislature repealed I.C. §49‐352 and enacted §18‐8002 which provided for a
one‐hundred‐eighty‐day suspension period. The increased suspension period does not
constitute a substantial change in the law or new assumption of jurisdiction requiring
tribal consent. The state of Idaho had previously assumed jurisdiction in this area of the
law pursuant to Congress' consent in 1963, and further permission or consent from the
Nez Perce Tribe, under 25 U.S.C. §1321, is not required for enforcement of I.C. §18‐8002.
Enactment of further procedures and an increase or change in penalty as implemented
by the Idaho legislature in I.C. §18‐8002 does not alter the area of jurisdiction assumed
by the state and, although the statute has been amended to increase the suspension
period, it is not a substantial change sufficient to warrant invalidating the jurisdiction
which had been conferred and assumed by the state of Idaho in 1963.
117 Idaho 1009, 793 P.2d 682, 686 (1990)(emphasis added). Here, the assumption of jurisdiction
over a right‐of‐way substantially alters traditional state jurisdiction. “[W]e must narrowly
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construe Section 67‐5101(G) so as to minimize erosion of tribal sovereignty.” State v. Ambro,
142 Idaho at 83. The State’s broad construction of highway to include a 200‐foot right‐of‐way
off of the traveled portion erodes tribal sovereignty beyond what was intended when the State
assumed jurisdiction in 1963.
2.

“Maintained” in I.C. §67‐5101(G) Should Not Include the Gravel Pit.

In State v. Smith, 124 Idaho 671, 862 P.2d 1093 (Ct.App. 1993), the Court held that it was
sufficient for the State to prove that the defendant drove on State Highway 95, because the State
had a statutory duty to maintain the highway and was presumed to have performed its statutory
duties. 124 Idaho at 675, 862 P.2d at 1096. The Court did not address the issue of whether
portions not so maintained fall within I.C. §67‐5101(G).
The prosecution presented testimony at the jury trial related to the gravel pit right‐of‐
way. State of Idaho Transportation Department road foreman, Mark Shuster, testified:
Q.

And can you describe the rock pit for us? What’s there?

A.

A hole. It’s just the mountain where they’ve been taking rock out of there for
years and years and years …. We have a couple of stockpiles in there from old
rock stuff in the middle right now, and there’s some what we call rotomill tailings,
kind of black stuff that we ground up off the highway that’s in another spot there.

Q.

Other than stockpiles are there any buildings or any other improvements in the
rock pit?

A.

No.
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Q.

And does the—does your department use that rock pit on a regular basis?

A.

Yeah, at different times.

Q.

What for?

A.

Crushers have set up in there, you know, to crush rock for like sealcoats and road
jobs, you know that we have. There’s been times when we had to take stuff out
of there for emergencies, you know, like a slide or something. We stick it there
for a little while and take it out later. Right now, like we’re storing some stuff that
we don’t know what to do with at the moment.

Q.

But the department uses that rock pit on occasion, correct?

A.

Yes.
***

Q.

So, this is not—this gravel pit is not part of the roadway of State Highway 13, is it?

A.

No. It’s just ground that we take care of with it, yeah.

Q.

In fact, this right‐of‐way here that you’re utilizing this for, you said some 20 years
or more to crush rock to use on the highway, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Or a place to store other stuff?

A.

Correct.

(Tr. 2, p. 11, L. 5 – p. 6, L. 10; Tr. 2, p. 21, L. 22 – p. 22, L. 6.) The gravel pit is not plowed in the
winter and is not maintained for public vehicular travel. (Tr. 2, p. 22, Ls. 7‐25.) Although
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members of the public have used it as a pull‐out while traveling on the highway, it is not a
maintained thoroughfare for highway travel or a maintained rest area. Id.
The dictionary definition of “maintain” is “acts of repairs and other acts to prevent a
decline, lapse or cessation from existing state or condition …” Black’s Law Dictionary 859 (5th ed.
1979). Even if the Court applied the statutory definition of “maintenance” from the Idaho
Highways and Bridges Act, the definition should not include the gravel pit:
"Maintenance" means to preserve from failure or decline, or repair, refurbish, repaint or
otherwise keep an existing highway or public right‐of‐way in a suitable state for use
including, without limitation, snow removal, sweeping, litter control, weed abatement
and placement or repair of public safety signage.
Idaho Code § 40‐114(3). The definition by its language requires maintenance to a suitable state
for vehicular travel. It does not include a suitable state for crushing and storing gravel.
Idaho’s appellate court recently declined to expand jurisdiction, and predicted where an
ever‐expanding assertion of jurisdiction can lead:
According to the state, Section 67‐5101(G) authorizes it to prosecute any crime
committed by an Indian within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, so long as the
crime was committed while the Indian was riding in a vehicle on a state maintained
highway. The state contends that where police discover an Indian in possession of
contraband, whether stolen property or a controlled substance, the crime concerns
motor vehicles because the Indian possesses the contraband while being an occupant of
a motor vehicle. Thus, under the state's proposed interpretation, if an Indian traveling as
a passenger was found in possession of a bracelet, which was stolen from an Indian on
the Indian reservation, the state could prosecute that Indian for grand theft by
possession, provided that the bracelet was discovered during a traffic stop on a state
maintained highway. Such an interpretation of Section 67‐5101(G) subsumes state
jurisdiction over all crimes, rendering the statute's words indicating the state accepted
jurisdiction for enforcement of state laws concerning the operation and management
of motor vehicles without significance.
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State v. Ambro, 123 P.3d at 715 (emphasis added). The phrase “maintained by the county or
state, or political subdivisions thereof” has to have meaning. “Statutes and ordinances should
be construed so that effect is given to their provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or
insignificant. [Citation omitted.].” Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 46
P.3d 9, 14 (2002). Proper construction of “maintained” should not include the gravel pit area.
Current government policy favors tribal sovereignty over assimilation:
Congress has usually invoked the need for law enforcement and civil dispute resolution
in Indian Country as the justification for empowering the states.
Most statutes passed by Congress that chose state jurisdiction over tribal sovereignty to
address the problem were passed at a time when federal policy favored assimilation of
Indian people into non‐Indian social and political communities. [Footnote omitted.] Since
the 1960s, both Congress and the executive branch have supplanted that policy in favor
of one promoting tribal self‐determination ….
Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law §6.04[1] at 811 (2012 Ed.)(emphasis added).
It bears repeating: “If … the crime did not occur upon a publicly maintained road, state
law enforcement officers would have no jurisdiction under I.C. §67‐5101(G) and so no power …
either on or off the right‐of‐way.” State v. Barros, supra. Jurisdiction over the enforcement of
criminal offenses relating to the operation of motor vehicles upon highways and roads
maintained by the state, within the boundaries of Indian reservations, does not extend beyond
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those highways and roads. The State should not have been permitted to assert jurisdiction over
Mr. Warden under the facts of this case.3

D.

Mr. Warden’s Judgment Of Conviction Should Be Vacated.
Mr. Warden asserts that the district court’s decision requires that his judgment of

conviction be vacated and the case be dismissed. The State of Idaho lacked jurisdiction to
prosecute Mr. Warden. Therefore, the judgment of conviction for should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Warden respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction.
DATED this _____ day of April, 2016.

VICTORIA A. OLDS
Attorney for Appellant

There is a mechanism in place for the State assuming broader jurisdiction via negotiated consent
agreements with Tribal councils. I.C. §67‐5102.
3
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